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Natural selection is the strongest known antientropic process in the universe when operating at the biological level and may
also operate at the cosmological level. Consideration of how biological natural selection creates adaptations may illuminate the
consequences and significance of cosmological natural selection. An organismal trait is more likely to constitute an adaptation if
characterized by more improbable complex order, and such order is the hallmark of biological selection. If the same is true of traits
created by selection in general, then the more improbably ordered something is (i.e., the lower its entropy), the more likely it is to
be a biological or cosmological adaptation. By this logic, intelligent life (as the least-entropic known entity) is more likely than black
holes or anything else to be an adaptation designed by cosmological natural selection.This view contrasts with Smolin’s suggestion
that black holes are an adaptation designed by cosmological natural selection and that life is the by-product of selection for black
holes. Selection may be the main or only ultimate antientropic process in the universe/multiverse; that is, much or all observed
order may ultimately be the product or by-product of biological and cosmological selection.
“Another, related meaning of entropy is that it is a measure of disorganization. The atoms in a gas are disordered to the extent
that there is no way to tell one from another. In equilibrium there is maximal disorder, because every atom moves randomly,
with the same average energy as any other atom. A living system, on the contrary, continually creates an enormous number of
different kind of molecules, each of which generally perform a unique function. The entropy of a living thing is consequently
much lower, atom for atom, than anything else in the world.”
Smolin (1997), The Life of the Cosmos, p. 28.
1. Introduction
The second law of thermodynamics explains the ever-
increasing presence of disorder in physical systems. But this
process of increasing entropy (the “entropic process”) could
not occur without some order in the first place. Is there
also a fundamental process that accounts for the presence of
order in physical systems? Such a process has certainly been
identified for biological systems: natural selection causes the
extraordinarily orderly (i.e., adaptive) properties of organ-
isms. However, to what extent could the selective process,
conceived in cosmological and not just biological terms, also
account for most or even all order in the universe?
To appreciate the possible significance of selection as
a general antientropic process, it helps to consider what
we already know about how selection operates at the bio-
logical level. Such consideration suggests not only that se-
lection may be the fundamental source of order in the
universe—essentially, the opposite of the entropic proc-
ess—but also that intelligent life is more likely than any other
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2. Adaptations Designed by
Biological Natural Selection
Living organisms are the least entropic (i.e., the most com-
plexly ordered and improbable) entities known to exist [1, 2].
Biological natural selection (BNS) (intended as shorthand for
all types of biological selection, including natural selection
proper [3], sexual selection [4], and kin selection [5]),
then, is the strongest known antientropic process, because
it creates organisms. Organisms have extraordinarily low
entropy because BNS endows them with adaptations that
ultimately enable genetic replication. Achieving replication is
a complex and highly ordered process and requires organ-
isms that are themselves complex and highly ordered. That
is, it requires organisms composed of myriad adaptations
that are functionally specialized for solving diverse kinds
of adaptive problems (such as breathing, seeing, digesting,
and mating). By enabling the organism to succeed in the
competition with conspecifics to survive and reproduce,
the genes which encode these adaptations are ultimately
able to replicate [5–7]. Genes are the replicators in this
process, and the organism—which is essentially a bundle
of adaptations—is their vehicle of selection [8]. In sum-
mary, then, the selective process works by favouring those
genes which, by encoding adaptive designs that outcompete
other designs, most successfully enable their own replica-
tion.
BNS is the only known process that can design an organ-
ismal adaptation, but not all organismal traits are adaptations.
Traits may also be by-products of adaptations or just random
noise that is irrelevant to replication and therefore invisible
to selection. For example, an umbilical cord is an adaptation,
but the navel it leaves behind is its by-product, and the
precise size and shape of this navel are just noise. To assess
whether an organismal trait is an adaptation or not, we look
for evidence of special design [6]: how precisely designed is
that adaptation for solving a specific adaptive problem, like a
key that has been precisely engineered to fit a particular lock?
To identify a trait as an adaptation is ultimately to make a
probability assessment: what is the likelihood that this trait
would have arisen by chance, as a narrowly tailored solution
to a specific adaptive problem [7]? The more improbable a
trait is in this regard—that is, the lower its entropy—themore
likely it is to be an adaptation, as opposed to a by-product or
noise.
For example, the mammalian eye is composed of dozens
of diverse components that, through coordinated action, can
convert electromagnetic radiation into information that is
useful to the organism. We can be virtually 100 per cent
certain that the eye is an adaptation, because it would be
essentially impossible for such a functionally complex device
to arise by chance. This level of certainty must be reduced
when considering many other traits; however, even those
which still seem very likely to be adaptations. For exam-
ple, people whose relatively recent evolutionary ancestors
lived for many generations in colder northern environments
have less melanin in their skin than those whose ancestors
hailed from sunnier equatorial regions. Their lighter skin is
probably an adaptation designed to allow more ultraviolet
radiation to penetrate the skin and thus allow the body to
produce more vitamin D. Compared to the eye, however,
reduced epidermalmelanin is much less improbably complex
and therefore much more likely to arise by chance (i.e.,
more entropic). Even if we are quite confident that reduced
melanin is an adaptation to northern climates, its status as
an adaptation is necessarily less certain than that of the
eye.
3. Adaptations Designed by Cosmological
Natural Selection
According to the theory of cosmological natural selection
(CNS), we live in a multiverse in which the most-represented
universe designs are those best at replication. Compared to
BNS, CNS is a vastly less thoroughly documented and well-
understood process. We can still reasonably consider, how-
ever, what the consequences would be if CNS were true. My
goal here is not to present an extensive case for why CNS
could plausibly occur, but rather to take an adaptationist per-
spective on the CNS theory that has already been developed
by Smolin [1, 9] and others [10]. According to this theory,
black holes are the mechanism by which universes replicate,
and universe designs are selected to produce greater numbers
of black holes. However, if we apply the adaptationist logic
outlined above to Smolin’s model, then life appears more
likely than black holes to be a mechanism of universe
replication.
As noted above, we can judge the extent to which an
organismal trait is likely to be an adaptation by conducting
a probability assessment: traits that are more complexly
ordered are less likely to arise by chance and thus more
likely to be the direct product of the strongest documented
antientropic process, BNS. Conducting this assessment is
often relatively straightforward when the organism is the
vehicle of selection, but what about when the universe is
the vehicle? According to Smolin’s model, black holes are
adaptations designed by CNS. Other theorists, however, have
proposed that intelligent life may constitute such an adapta-
tion, an idea known as “cosmological natural selection with
intelligence” or CNS-I [11] (or alternatively, “cosmological
artificial selection” [12]). CNS-I models propose that intel-
ligence functions ultimately (after evolving to a sufficiently
sophisticated state) to create new universes that replicate
the physical laws and parameters of its home universe
[11–15].
So which is more likely to be an adaptation for the
replication of universes, intelligent life or black holes? Based
on adaptationist logic, life would seem to be the more
promising candidate of the two, simply because it is far more
complexly ordered and less likely to arise by chance. As the
most improbable known thing in the universe, designed by
the strongest known antientropic process, life seems more
likely than black holes—or any other known entity—to be
a CNS-designed adaptation. That is not to say, however,
that black holes could not also be such adaptations. Just as
eyes and reduced skin pigmentation could both be BNS-
selected adaptations, life and black holes could both be CNS-
selected adaptations. But just as eyes are more likely to be an
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adaptation than reduced melanin, life is more likely to be an
adaptation than black holes.
4. Relationship of These Ideas to Other
CNS and CNS-I Theories
The main goal of this paper is to present an adaptationist
revision of the CNS theory [1, 9, 10] which proposes black
holes as the most likely mechanism of universe replication.
If we assume, as CNS theory does, that universes reproduce
themselves, then everything we know about how selection
works (at the biological level) implies that life is more
likely than black holes to be an adaptation for enabling
this reproduction. This adaptationist perspective does not
necessarily imply, however, that some form of intelligent
life was responsible for designing our own universe. We
already know, from observing BNS, that a nonintentional,
purely mechanistic selective process can be a masterful
designer of functional complexity; no intelligence or foresight
is required. From this perspective, the conditions of our
universe that seem finely tuned to permit life to exist [16]
could be the result of an entirely mechanistic selective
process. To the extent that intelligent life could eventually
evolve into a relatively effectivemeans of universe replication,
biofriendly universe designs should become relatively well
represented in amultiverse. An alternative CNS-I view is that
our universe was in fact designed by some form of intelligent
life in a parental universe [14]. Although this proposition
should certainly be considered, it seems less parsimonious
than the mechanistic model: in suggesting that adaptations
are produced by something more elaborate than a mechanis-
tic selective process, it makes assumptions that go beyond
our observations of how adaptations are generated at the
biological level. Further, it does not address the issue of how
fine-tuning would emerge in the first place: unless we assume
an infinite regression of biofriendly universes being produced
by intelligent life, then we must assume that biofriend-
liness was at some point generated by a nonintelligent
process.
5. Conclusion
The main considerations discussed above are summarized
in Figure 1. If our observation of BNS is a reliable guide
to what we should expect from CNS, then there are two
especially interesting implications. The first is that although
both intelligent life and black holes are plausible candidates to
be CNS-designed adaptations, the probability of being such
an adaptation is higher for life than it is for black holes (or
any other known object in the universe). The second is that
CNS may be the primary cause of cosmological order, just as
BNS is the primary cause of biological order. In other words,
much or all order we observe in the universe may ultimately
be the product or by-product of selection for replication at the
biological and cosmological levels. Without this order, there
would be no entropic process (because nothing would decay
to a less-ordered state) and therefore no arrow of time [17]. In
sum, the process of selection may be far more fundamental
Order Disorder
Selection Replication
Figure 1: The selective and entropic processes as the primary
causes of order and disorder. The linked concepts in the figure’s
upper half (order and disorder) represent the entropic process of
ever-increasing disorder. The linked concepts in the lower half
(replication and selection) represent processes of biological or
cosmological natural selection: genetic or universe designs which
outreplicate others achieve, via selection, greater representation
in a population or multiverse. Selection leads to order because
it produces the most orderly (and thus least entropic) known
objects in the universe—adaptations—the function of which is to
enable replication against the tide of the entropic process. Because
adaptations must realize the complex goal of replication, they are
characterized by improbable complex order, and such order is the
hallmark of selection. The more improbably and complexly ordered
something is (i.e., the lower its entropy), the more likely it is to
be a biological or cosmological adaptation; intelligent life would
thus be more likely than black holes (or anything else) to be a
cosmological adaptation. Selectionmay be themain or only ultimate
antientropic process in the universe/multiverse; that is, much or all
order we observe may be the product or by-product of selection for
replication at the biological and cosmological levels.
to explaining the nature of our universe than is generally
supposed.
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